OUDCE Philosophy Weekends and Day Courses at Rewley House

Past Events

Below listed events between 1987 and 2023 are mostly available to Philsoc members via the Events Archive page as MP3 recordings.

2026

February 14-15: Early Modern Philosophers

Julia Weckend, Dr Stephen Law, Prof John Cottingham

Step into the minds that shaped the modern world at our special Weekend Philosophy Event — a compelling series of accessible and engaging talks exploring the groundbreaking ideas of Early Modern philosophers.

From the 17th to the mid-18th century, thinkers like Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume challenged centuries of tradition and reimagined the nature of reality, the self, and society. This weekend, we’ll dive into their revolutionary ideas — no prior philosophy experience required.t

Please note: this event will close to enrolments at 23:59 on 11 February 2026.

2025

February 08: Thinking Machines and the Ethics of AI

David Storrs-Fox and Jen Semler

Robots, cyborgs and AI systems fire our imaginations and have inspired many movies, from HAL in 2001: A Space Odyssey to Data in Star Trek and Skynet in The Terminator. What moral issues do they raise?

This day will explore the question of whether AI, robots and cyborgs (part biological, part machine) could ever be conscious and/or deserving of moral consideration, and the ethical implications of their use.

Is AI really a threat to us, and if so, how? Might robots and AI make us morally worse, or perhaps morally better?

This event will be of interest to anyone fascinated and concerned about rapid developments in technology, AI, and robotics. The talks are highly accessible and non-technical from leading researcher(s) in these fields.

April 05: Thinking Critically about News Media

Grace Blakeley, Justin Schlosberg and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown

An exploration of the philosophical and ethical issues raised by news media, be it traditional sources such as terrestrial TV and newspapers, or online provision.

The day includes discussion of issues such as media ownership, the reliability and accuracy of political reporting, post digital news provision, and propaganda and ‘fake news’.

We will look at reporting on Russia, China and conflict in The Middle East and Ukraine. We will also look at traditional news media, their ownership and their regulation.

We will be joined by one of Britain’s leading journalists, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown.

June 14: Good Citizens and Moral Catastrophes

Dr Stephen Law

How best to raise good citizens who will do the right thing even when under pressure to do wrong?

Should we aim to raise ‘Enlightened’ citizens, in Kant’s sense, who throw off external authority, and think critically and independently?

Is there an important role for tradition and authority, perhaps including religious tradition and authority?

Do faith schools have a role to play?

To what extent should we be concerned about moral relativism – does it pose a threat to Western civilisation?

Join us in Oxford to discuss these questions and more.

December 06: The Philosophy of Physics and Space-Time

Dr Stephen Law

Join us for a stimulating exploration of some of the deepest questions in the Philosophy of Physics, led by two experts in the field.

The day will present clear and engaging introductions to foundational topics in modern physics—from Newtonian mechanics, to the revolutionary implications of Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the profound puzzles posed by competing interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.

Whether you’re a seasoned physicist, a philosopher, or simply someone curious about the nature of reality, this event provides a rare opportunity to deepen your understanding.

2024

February 24: Self in a Future Society: A Philosophical Enquiry

Dr Julia Weckend

The concept of self has undergone significant changes throughout its long history. At a time when old controversies on how to best think about the nature of the self are still very much alive, new conceptions are starting to come into focus (data-selves, extended selves) which may once more require radical rethinking.

Human beings, minds and selves are inevitably shaped by their environments, and in return they determine their institutions, governmental bodies, and ultimately political systems. ‘Smart’ devices, virtual agents and generative AI already play an increasing role in the way humans structure their activities and think of themselves. ‘Intelligent systems’ are expected to become more and more autonomous and agentive to the point that they are perceived as potentially posing unprecedented threats. How might this new cognitive ecology where social mining and data-tracking are commonplace and where AI is said to know us better than our partners and friends, threaten privacy, restrict the scope of human action, and change the fabric of society

On the optimistic side, in our gradual transitioning into a posthumanist world we expect that developing technologies will greatly enhance human intellectual, physical and psychological capacities and afford us new ways of expressing ourselves. The capacity to tackle all forms of diseases relieves us from our dependence on the body and promises an existence free from physical and emotional suffering and (near-)immortality. But with it come considerations that put our current notions of human subjectivity and particularly human embodiment under substantial stress

On the same token a counterpart question arises for artificial intelligences, machine consciousness and selfhood. There are ethical implications on how to expand the circle of moral concern when extending subjectivities beyond the human species to include non-human or silicon-based agents and their selves.

April 06: Animals: Rights and Wrongs

Anna Charlton & Gary Francione

This day school will introduce the basic elements of animal ethics.

Animal rights, animal welfare, the status of animals as property, and the concept of personhood (as applied to humans and nonhumans) will be discussed.

Questions asked include:

Are animals merely things or do they have moral value?
If animals have moral value, what are our moral obligations to them?
Is vegetarianism sufficient?
Is veganism required?
Can we justify domestication?
What are the implications of the status of animals as property?
Does (or can) the law sufficiently protect animal interests?
Is there any relationship between human rights and nonhuman rights?

June 15-16: Circumcision, Abortion, Compulsory Vaccination: Philosophy of Bodily Integrity

Dr Brian Earp, Dr Lisa Forsberg & Dr Stephen Law

Do we have the right to cut or modify a child’s genitals for religious or cultural reasons (for example, through penile circumcision or ‘ritual nicking’ of the vulva)? Should teenagers be allowed to alter their bodies through tattoos, piercing or cosmetic surgeries? When, if ever, are doctors justified in medically treating or vaccinating people against their will, or, if children, the will of their parents? Can governments legitimately limit the right to abortion?

This two-day event will explore these and other philosophical puzzles about our bodies and our rights over them, many with a medical dimension.

The speakers are two leading researchers in the field, having lectured internationally and published peer-reviewed articles on these and related topics in top bioethics journals.

October 26: Philosophy and Climate Change

Helen Barnard and Rupert Read

A day exploring the philosophy of climate change. What are our ethical responsibilities so far as care of the planet is concerned? What moral responsibilities do we have to future generations? What kinds of action are ethically permitted – and perhaps even required of us – in protesting and combatting climate change?

Climate change is a global concern. This event aims to inform and educate the public on the ethical and other philosophical issues that surround this mounting crisis.

Rupert Read is one of the world’s leading authorities and campaigners on environmental ethics and Helen Barnard is an expert on the philosophy of Climate Change.

2023

January 14: Contemporary Humanism: An Introduction

Dr Thiago Alves Pinto and Dr Stephen Law

Contemporary humanism is explained as a view that typically combines:

an emphasis on the role of science and reason
the acceptance of atheism
The view that this is very probably the only life we have. There is no heaven or hell awaiting us
a commitment to the existence and importance of moral value
emphasis on our individual moral autonomy and responsibility
a commitment to political secularism
belief that we can enjoy significant, meaningful lives even if there is no God, and whether or not we happen to be religious

All seven views will be unpacked and religious and other critiques of them will be examined. In particular, we will explore the limits of science and reason and whether science can threaten religious belief, the possibility of leading meaningful lives in the absence of religion, political secularism and the separation of Church and State, how best to raise moral citizens (within a religious framework vs. within a secular framework), and the work of campaigning humanist groups such as Humanists UK and the American Humanist Association.

February 25: The Limits of Free Speech: Offence, Hate Speech and No Platforming

Dr Doug Bamford and Kenan Malik

This day school explores the many complicated and sometimes emotive issues surrounding free speech. Almost everyone believes that there should be some restrictions on free speech. But where exactly should we draw the line?

There is increasing pressure across social media to silence certain voices. Is this unjustified censorship, or reasonable restrictions to protect vulnerable groups and individuals? Are universities and other institutions justified in ‘no-platforming’ certain speakers, and if so, when? Does causing deep offence to religious people justify placing legal limits on what can be said about their beliefs? Are accusations of, for example, Islamophobia, antisemitism, and transphobia being weaponised in order to shut down important debates? If someone feels that they are a victim of prejudice, does that guarantee that they are? Under what circumstances is someone guilty of ‘hate speech’, and what legal or other restrictions should be placed on such speech?

We will be unpacking and examining the philosophical and political arguments on either side.

March 11: The Puzzle of Personal Identity: What Makes Me the Same Person over Time

Dr David Edmonds and Prof Paul Snowdon

Suppose I invite you to enter a teletransporter for an exciting adventure in space travel. In this teletransporter a copy will be made of every cell in your body. Whilst your brain and body are destroyed on Earth, a new being, a facsimile, will appear almost instantly on Planet Zog. No need for a tedious journey in a space craft. The recreated person on Planet Zog will look indistinguishable from you, it will have all your memories?

But will it be you?

‘Personal Identity’ is one of the most puzzling areas in philosophy. Many philosophers have grappled with it, from John Locke in the 17th Century to Derek Parfit in the 20th.

To test our intuitions about personal identity, philosophers have come up with weird and wonderful thought experiments. Locke asked us to imagine that a prince and a cobbler swapped souls, so that the memories of the prince were in the body of the cobbler and vice-versa. Parfit asked us to imagine what would happen if a brain was split in two, with the two hemispheres being implanted in two separate bodies.

There’s much at stake; the issue matters. Your position on Personal Identity may affect how you regard the past – should a person be punished for an act that was committed a decade earlier? It may affect how you view the future – should you bother to put money into a pension scheme or splurge everything so as to have fun today? How you view Personal Identity might even affect your attitude to death.

May 06: UFOs to Psychics: Thinking about Weird Things

Prof Chris French, Ms Deborah Hyde and Dr Stephen Law

An exploration of a range of ‘weird’ beliefs and experiences, from alien abduction and angels to conspiracy theories and miraculous cures.

What psychological mechanisms are involved in generating such beliefs? Is the scientific community justifiably skeptical about such beliefs, or are scientists for the most part just closed-minded naysayers? Doesn’t the fact that so many people report such experiences give them at least some credibility? How should we assess the evidence when it comes to belief in the paranormal, conspiracy theories, and so on? What even counts as good evidence?

One session, led by Deborah Hyde, anthropologist and former editor of The Skeptic magazine, will focus in particular on poltergeist activity (perhaps listen to The Battersea Poltergeist on BBC Sounds for more information).

The other sessions approach weird beliefs from the perspective of psychology (Prof. Chris French) and philosophy and critical thinking (Dr Stephen Law), and provide both numerous illustrations and principles for assessing them.

October 21-22: Philosophy and Art

Dr Julia Weckend, Dr Mette Leonard Høeg, Dr Dan O'Brien & Dr Warren Buckland

This weekend event begins with Julia Weckend and an overview of Philosophy of Art – what is art, essentially? Might the philosophy of Wittgenstein provide a clue? Mette Hoeg then explores literature as a crucial space for the development of and experimentation with philosophical and scientific ideas. Using key texts from the Modernist period, including Kafka’s The Trial, she explores how literature and fictional narrative enable humans to navigate the radical uncertainties of scientific and technological progress and of existence in general.

Dan O’Brien considers the relation between philosophy and the visual arts and the various ways in which artists can be seen as pursuing philosophical investigations through their art practice. On Sunday, Warren Buckland then turns our attention to fiction and the ontological status of implicit cinematic narrators in fictional narratives, viewed through the philosophical perspectives of realism, nominalism, and conceptualism.

Finally, Julia Weckend notes about two apparently indiscernible objects that one might be a work of art and the other not. Examples include Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes and Tracy Emin’s My Bed. Why is Emin’s bed an artwork, while yours isn’t? Getting a hold of that certain extra should give us an idea of what makes something a work of art.

December 09: Living in a Material World: A Philosophical Perspective

Prof David Papineau & Dr Stephen Law

A day exploring key philosophical topics relating to mind, meaning and metaphysics with Professor David Papineau, one of the world’s leading researchers in these fields. Papineau is one of Britain’s best-known and most highly-regarded philosophers, with a reputation for writing very accessible, inclusive books intended for a wide audience.

Papineau believes that we live in a natural, material world. However, there are notorious philosophical puzzles about how such a material world is able to accommodate things like consciousness, moral value and meaning. How, in particular, is it even possible for a material thing, such as a human being, to be conscious? Is it possible for a pain or some other conscious experience to be something physical, such as a brain state? And how do these squiggles, or sounds in the air, come to mean something? What is meaning, exactly?

Once we start thinking philosophically about mind and meaning, they can begin to seem almost magical – as something that the natural, material world could not possibly, by itself, contain or produce. So can mind and meaning be naturalized, and if so, how?

The day comprises three lectures – on mind, meaning and metaphysics – and a final session in which David Papineau is in conversation with Stephen Law.

2022

February 05-06: Human Nature: Does Evolutionary Explanation Have Limits?

Anthony O'Hear and Friedel Weinert

Darwin’s Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection might reasonably be considered one of the most successful theories of all times. But how should we understand it? Are there in fact two theories rather than one (linear and branching evolution)? Can the theory be used both to explain and to predict?

What, furthermore, are the implications of Darwin’s theory for some of the problems that we consider in philosophy? Can Darwin’s theory account for human nature, for example, or is there something about human beings that requires supplementary explanation? Can Darwin’s theory be appealed to in explanation of the emergence, for example, of the human mind? Might Darwin’s theory be applied to our political, social and economic behaviour? Or might it, in such an application, be thought to defeat itself as Marxianism and Freudianism do?

During this weekend we will hear two philosophers discuss what the Theory of Natural Selection can, and can’t explain.

February 12 (one day): John Rawls at 100 (no recordings available)

Dr Doug Bamford and Dr Sabrina Martin (Chair Ms Audrey Borowski)

Rawls is widely considered the most important political philosopher of the 20th century, recipient of several prizes including the National Humanities Medal. His works have been used in court rulings and invoked by politicians. People who have not read his works may find themselves using his ideas.

Rawls is best known for his defence of liberal egalitarianism in his first book, A Theory of Justice (1971). This book took elements of the social contract tradition to argue for principles of justice with a liberal and egalitarian slant over the Utilitarian approach which prevailed at the time.

In the first half of the day we will look at Rawls’ way of approaching moral and political philosophy, considering whether this is still relevant. We then look at how he applied his approach to the basic institutions of society, his theory of justice. The most discussed of his principles of justice is his famous ‘difference principle.’ This holds that inequalities should be allowed to the extent that they benefit the worst off. How does Rawls argue for this and does this influence economists and politicians today?

In the second half of the day we will consider Rawls’ later work, Political Liberalism and its ongoing influence on politics and the law. Rawls argues that political life should be conducted according to a secular ‘public reason’ which shows respect to those who disagree. Questions of tolerating the intolerant are a perpetual theme in liberalism. Those who are unable to sign up to the requirements of political liberalism are labelled unreasonable. Is this fair?

Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice is one of the most cited works in the humanities and social sciences of the 20th century. It has influenced not only moral and political philosophy but also economics and law.

This day school will summarise Rawls’ contribution and consider its ongoing influence in both academic discourse and in the wider world.

February 26 (one day): A Day with the Stoics (no recordings available)

Peter Wyss

Stoicism is an ancient school of philosophy that is gaining prominence again. One reason for this revival is the Stoics’ concern with making philosophy relevant as something that ought to be lived, or somehow be connected to our life. Doing philosophy is taking care of oneself, and considering how best to live a life that is also worth living.

In four thematic and interactive sessions we discuss a range of exemplary passages from the works of Seneca (e.g., from On the Happy Life) and Epictetus (e.g., from the Discourses). We focus on the period of the early Roman Empire (roughly 30–180 AC), but occasionally glance at the original Athenian Stoics (roughly 300–50 BC). We explore a variety of central ethical themes, and examine to what extent, and in what ways, Stoic ideas matter for our own lives now. Stoic teaching was public and open to anyone in antiquity: and so beginners in philosophy are most welcome today too.

A course pack with the relevant passages and sources will be available in advance.

March 05 (one day): Meaning and Use: Philosophy of Language (no recordings available)

Dr Hossein Dabbagh (Chair Dr Doug Bamford)

What kind of actions can we perform with our words? What is the relationship between the meaning of an utterance and the context in which the utterance is produced?

This day school attempts to introduce you to one of the dominant contemporary traditions in the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of language. Philosophy of language is mostly concerned with the role that language plays in our thinking. We will explore how language works, to determine when (and how) we speak meaningfully in different contexts. How do we understand each other’s intentions in our communications? How language users interpret words and signs?

We will also examine how people use their cultural background and assumption, even unconsciously, in their interpretation and conversation. To get a grasp on this, we will particularly study the Speech Act theory, Implicatures and the Cooperative Principle, Embodied Cognition, and Conceptual Metaphors. These theories and principles give us different tools to analyse natural language in a consistent way.

April 16 (one day): Games, Pictures, Rules and Therapies (no recordings available)

Dr Roxana Baiasu (Chair Ms Audrey Borowski)

Wittgenstein is one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century, both in Europe and in the Anglo-American tradition. In the 1930’s he announced his break with the tradition of philosophy. His work revolutionised the evolution of Analytic philosophy and shaped a significant part of its future development.

This day school focuses on a few central themes of his major later work, the Philosophical Investigations, themes which include: the Augustinian picture of language, language-games, general concepts and family resemblances, rules and rule-following, and philosophical methodology. The day aims to develop an understanding of these themes, an awareness of Wittgenstein’s particular style and method of philosophising and a grasp of the distinctive role of his thought in the history of philosophy.

May 07-08: Might Ignorance Be Bliss? (no recordings available)

Rachel Fraser and Bernhard Salow

Might our judgements or what we take to be evidencebe systematically biased or irrational? To what extent are we able to transcend our current perspectives? How do we handle the potential conflict between past and future versions of ourselves? And how do we resolve the conflicts between the demands of the evidence, the search for truth, and the moral and practical constraints we are subject to?

This weekend will introduce you to philosophical tools for thinking about how to manage and respond to evidence. On the one hand, evidence is usually valuable: the more we know, the better our decisions tend to be. On the other hand, sometimes knowing more makes us worse off---for example, when the evidence we gather is misleading, or we interpret it in a biased way. We will explore how to reason about these trade-offs in a precise way, to determine when (and why) it does (and doesnt) make sense to continue gathering evidence before making a decision.

September 30 - December 02: Introducing Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Dr Stephen Law

What gives these squiggles meaning? What is meaning exactly? And what is the mind? These questions can quickly generate puzzlement and confusion, leading to all sorts of philosophical theories. In particular, we may be quickly drawn to the view that the mind is an inner realm necessarily inaccessible to others, and that meaning is a private process that takes place in that inner realm. These pictures then generate classic philosophical problems, such as: How can I know whether there Is a world outside my mind? and: How can I know that anyone else has a mind?

According to Wittgenstein, once we start to think philosophically, we can quickly become enthralled by 'pictures' of meaning and mind that then hold us captive. Wittgenstein's aim is to break the spell these pictures cast over us. What we require are not solutions to these classic philosophical problems, but a kind of therapy so that we come to recognise that they are actually pseudo-problems. We look at many concrete illustrations of how Wittgenstein's approach can be applied.

We will also look at Wittgenstein's work on religious language, and his suggestion that our failure to recognise how religious language is used generates deep philosophical puzzlement about God and faith.

October 22: The Limits of Philosophy, Science and Religion

Dr Stephen Law and Chris Oldfield

This course explores the respective limits of science, religion and philosophy.

To what extent can and does science threaten religious belief? Is the supernatural off-limits to science? Are those, like Richard Dawkins, who think science can potentially show that there is no God guilty of scientism – of supposing that science can answer every legitimate question? Are science and religion ‘non-overlapping magisteria’, as Stephen J. Gould claimed, with science focussed on the age of rocks and religion on the rock of ages? Can religious claims be laboratory tested, or empirically falsified? Or is this to misunderstand the nature of religious belief?

We also consider: if science and observation provide our only window on to reality, what room is left for philosophy, exactly? Can philosophical reflection reveal fundamental truths about the universe? If so, how? And if not, then what do philosophers do, exactly? Is philosophy ultimately a huge waste of time, as several prominent scientists suggested?

2021

November 27-28: Identifying Future-Proof Science

Philip Goff and Peter Vickers

Is science getting at the truth? Sceptics claim that, given all the ‘scientific revolutions’ in the history of science, we should expect further major changes in scientific thinking in the future. They ask: given the history of science, wouldn’t it be naïve to think that many/most current scientific theories reveal ‘the truth’, and will never be discarded in favour of other theories? After all, previous scientists thought so, and they were wrong.

Philosophers of science have resisted this line of thought by identifying important differences between past science and current science, including differences in the size of the scientific community, and the quantity and quality of the evidence involved. However, very big U-turns in science have been quite recent, including attitudes towards continental drift in the 1960s, and the dramatic revelation, in 1998, that the universe’s expansion is accelerating. It seems reasonable to suppose that very big U-turns will continue, especially when we dare to look 500 years ahead. It is even possible that a revolution going right to the core of the scientific method is required in order to tackle consciousness.

Thus we must ask the question: Is it possible to identify any future-proof science?

19 September (Day School): Moral Dilemmas

Amna Whiston (Ewert House, Lecture Room 9)

2020
January 11-12: Existentialism: Jonathan Webber and Kate KirkPatrick (Lecture Theatre)
According to Sartre that ‘existence precedes essence’ is the first principle’ of Existentialism. There is no ‘human nature’ determined by God or nature, there is no objective set of rules that we must follow to decide what to do. Instead we become what we are by our own choices. In his new book Rethinking Existentialism, Jonathan Webber offers an interpretation of existentialism as the ethical theory that human freedom is the foundation of all other values.
February 15-16: The Golden Age of Buddhism: Jan Westerhoff and Nilanjan Das (Tawney Room)
During this weekend we will be dealing with two central topics in the development of Buddhist thought. These correspond to two sections of Jan Westerhoff’s "The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy" (OUP 2018). One is the question whether there is a soul or substantial self. The other is the question whether there are any external objects. The schools of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā defended the existence of both a substantial self and of an external world, whereas the former was denied by the Abhidharma Buddhists, and both were denied by Yogācāra, a later school of Buddhism. Philosophers from the non-Buddhist classical Indian tradition unsurprisingly did not agree with the Buddhist conclusions.
March 07-08: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mathematics: Alex Paseau and Florian Steinberger (Tawney Room)
The philosophy of mathematics asks how mathematics fits in to our overall picture of the world. Mathematics is a big part of that picture, especially since it is applied so fruitfully in the sciences – not just the physical sciences but the social and cognitive sciences as well. But it’s also puzzling in a way that these sciences are not. Unlike them, it doesn’t seem to be about the physical world, at least not directly; we don’t perform experiments in mathematics in the way we do in physics or chemistry. But yet – unlike fiction say – it doesn’t seem to be made up either. We are constrained in mathematics. So what is mathematics about? And how do we know it? What is the special role of proof in mathematics, and why do mathematicians insist on it? What is nature of the logical constraints on mathematical reasoning? Is there but one correct logic? Or might there be several?
All subsequent 2020 events were cancelled because of the pandemic.

2019
January 12-13: Wittgenstein: Religion and Nonsense: Stephen Mulhall, OU and Mikel Burley, Leeds (Lecture Theatre)
Wittgenstein's ideas about religion have been much more influential than is sometimes thought. The first two lectures will consider this influence, concentrating on Wittgenstein's remarks on James Frazer's The Golden Bough and Wittgenstein's proposal that we overcome the temptation to view certain religious practices as simply confused or nonsensical. We shall look at this through the lens of D.Z.Phillips' 'contemplative conception of philosophy', the purpose of which is to disclose 'possibilities of sense' within religious forms of life. In lectures three and four we shall consider the connections between Wittgenstein's views on ethics and his treatment of value in the Tractatus, and so to his early conception of sense and nonsense in language. It will be suggested that Wittgenstein's treatment of absolute value in his 'Lecture on Ethics', taken together with his comparison of mathematical conjectures with riddles, provides a fruitful way of understanding a range of religious uses of language. It will be claimed that Wittgensteinian sense can be made of the thought that religious language is necessarily nonsensical, but none the worse for that; indeed, if it were not nonsensical, it could not have the significance that religious believers attribute to it, and to the faith it expresses.
February 16-17: The philosophy of colour: Derek Brown, University of Glasgow and Will Davies Univ. of B'ham (Tawney Room)
What is redness? Is redness the quality of an experience, the property of an object or a property that emerges from the interaction of visual systems like ours with objects that reflect light at a certain wavelength? Could a blind person form the same concept 'red' as a sighted person? Does the answer to the second question tell us anything about the answer to the first? During this weekend we shall be discussing colours, our perception of them, our concepts of them, and the philosophy of colour more generally.
March 09-10: Practical Stoicism: Christopher Gill, Exeterand John Sellars, Royal Holloway (Tawney Room)
There has been a resurgence of interest in Stoicism in recent years, with people as varied as cognitive psychotherapists, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, resilience trainers, practitioners of Buddhism, deep ecologists, and even the US military extolling its benefits. Each year thousands of people follow Stoic Week, an experiment aimed at testing its usefulness. But what is Stoicism? What are its central ethical claims? How did the Stoics conceive a good human life? During this weekend we shall examine both the philosophical foundations of Stoic ethics and techniques by which they might be put into practice.
April 06, 13:30: Philsoc AGM: The Annual General Meeting of the Society, preceeding the weekend's course on the mind-body problem. All members welcome!
April 06-07: The Status of the Mind-Body problem in 2019: Marianne Talbot (Tawney Room)
The Mind-Body problem is the problem of how our minds are related to our bodies (and in particular our brains). There was a time when it seemed obvious that our minds could exist without our brains (surely after the death of the body the mind lives on?). Then there was a time when it seemed obvious that mental states are states of the brain. It is today often assumed by the person in the street and indeed the neurologist in the university that the mind is the brain. But philosophers are not so sure. Indeed most philosophers these days would deny that the mind is the brain. But who are philosophers to pronounce on this? Come and find out.
May 18-19: Continental and Analytic Philosophy: Yvonne Sherratt, Bristol University and Mike Beaney Kings College (Sadler Room)
In the western world philosophy tends to divide into two 'schools' – the analytic school and the continental school. Although some people successfully straddle the two schools, most philosophers tend to work in either one or the other. During this weekend we will compare and contrast these two schools. We will look at the history and development of each school, and problems that each of them face.
October 07 - November 11, 14:00 - 15:30: Reason and Emotion (unaccredited lecture series): Julia Weckend (Lecture Theatre)
Emotions bear complex relationships to rationality. On one hand they are seen as arational or irrational, on the other they make our actions intelligible and arguably lift us above the purely mechanistic behaviours of machines. Much like human sensory perception, emotions perform an essential function: they inform us about the world. That said, Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma can be applied to emotions: we can pose the question why is something feared or loved? Is it because it is fear- or love-inspiring in itself? This is the objectivist’s outlook on emotion. In contrast, a subjectivist stance would be that something is fear- or love-inspiring because we fear or love it. In this case, the objects and qualities we find in the world are mere projections of our own attitudes. This course is an exploration into the possibility, extent and nature of the objectivity of emotions, and their contribution to rationality. We shall cast a light on historical perspectives on reason and emotion and compare these with more recent philosophical findings in this vibrant area of contemporary research.
October 19-20: God, Meaning and Objectivity: John Cottingham and Lloyd Strickland (Lecture Theatre)
In the early modern period it was widely assumed that a God-centred worldview was indispensable for making sense of the notions of objective truth and goodness, and that such objectivity provided a framework within which human beings could make sense of their lives. In today’s increasingly secular, atheistic and naturalistic outlook, do the notions of objective truth and value have to be given up?
November 23: A Romp through Philosophy for the Complete Beginner: Marianne Talbot (Lecture Theatre)
The first philosophers, working before the 5th century BC, looked for natural rather than supernatural explanations. Eschewing appeal to God they asked questions such as ‘what is existence?’, ‘what is truth?’, ‘what is justice?, ‘how should we live our lives’? Modern day philosophers still ask such questions, although the modern debate would seem very strange to one of the ancient philosophers. Philosophers conduct experiments, but these are thought experiments, constrained not by the laws of nature but the laws of logic. During these lectures we shall be looking at the history of philosophy, at the methodology used by modern day philosophers and at why philosophy is still needed in the context of the success of science. No prior experience of philosophy will be assumed.

2018
January 13-14: Equality, Opportunity and Difference: Jo Wollf and Emily McTernan (Lecture Theatre)
If we were asked which principles we’d like to see govern our society, many if not most people in the West would refer to equality. Yet our society is currently more unequal that ever (on one measurement of equality). Few would advocate strict equality, according to which resources would be divided equally amongst everyone. Such a distribution seems guaranteed to ensure inequality. But if this is not what we mean, what do we mean? And what resources do we want to distribute equally – material goods, or goods such as well-being or happiness? Or is it that we want to ensure equality of opportunity, so that equality of outcome is not something that we aim for? During this weekend we will look at these difficult questions, and others.
February 17-18: Kantian Metaphysics: Anil Gomes and Adrian Moore (Tawney Room)
Kant’s transcendental idealism consisted in his claim that both our experience of the empirical world and the empirical world itself have a structure that we ourselves impose (where this structure includes space, time, and causation). But he also denied that this structure is a feature of things as they are in themselves, quite independent of our experience of them. By combining these two theses Kant rejected both the ‘tabula rasa’ (blank slate) favoured by the empiricists, and the a priori knowledge of the world favoured by the rationalists. Kant also held that there are two aspects to reason, and this has important consequences for freedom. Practical reason (particularly morality) presupposes freewill, but theoretical reason cannot demonstrate that we are free. During this weekend we will discuss the thought of this hugely important philosopher.
March 10-11: Realism and Emergence in the Philosophy of Science: James Ladyman and Naomi Thompson (Lecture Theatre)
During this weekend school we will consider metaphysics and its relation to science. We will be considering whether we need metaphysics at all, and if so why. One view is that the two types of enquiry are needed to guide and constrain each other – the two are components of a complete understanding of the world. We will also look at the notions of ‘dependence’ and ‘emergence’. One area of philosophy where such notions might do important work is in accounting for the relationship between the mental and the physical. We will consider different accounts of metaphysical dependence and emergence, and how they might be used to clarify the debate.
April 07-08: Where is the Mind?: Marianne Talbot (Tawney Room)
There are all sorts of reasons for thinking that the mind is in the head. It is not, after all, events in the environment that make you do what you do, it is your beliefs about such events. Beliefs, surely, are in your head? If you think the mind is the brain, of course, you will certainly think that the mind is in the head. But in recent years many philosophers have turned their back on this obvious thought and embraced externalism in the philosophy of mind. In doing this they claim that mental states are not in the head. During this weekend we shall be considering the arguments for (and against) this claim, and the ramifications for its truth.
May 19-20: Beyond the Nature/Nurture Controversy: Moral Autonomy and Social Change: Ellen Fridland and Peter Railton (Sadler Room)
It is often asked of morality, "Is it nature or nurture?" Virtually everyone today agrees that the correct answer is "Both". But that answer opens new questions, not simply questions about the relative contribution of "nature" or "nurture" (or whether these can even be meaningfully separated), but also about whether there is something more to moral development that this debate usually presupposes. 'Nature' and 'nurture' as these terms are traditionally used cast the individual in a passive role in moral development – either by genetic inheritance or by inculcation of the norms of his society by socialization. We'd like to emphasize how that humans are equipped not just to receive such shaping forces, but also for active, original moral learning that can carry us beyond the moral world we inherit, and help explain how morality can be a domain of independent thinking, and vibrant innovation and change.
October 08 - November 12, 14:00 - 15:30: Explanation (unaccredited lecture series): Marianne Talbot (Lecture Theatre)
For human beings the intelligibility of our world is hugely important. We want – perhaps need – explanations for phenomenon that interests us. We want, that is, explanations to everything. But what is an explanation? And what is the process of explaining? Some people believe that all explanations are causal. But if so are there different types of causal explanation? Are reason explanations of our own behaviour, for example, a particular type of causal explanation? Will science ever explain everything? Or are there limits to scientific explanation? Recently it has been suggested that it is not the case that all explanations are causal. This is a live debate with some philosophers arguing that all apparent non-causal explanations are in fact causal, and others insisting that they are wrong.
October 20 - 21: Philosophy of Art in the Classical World: Angie Hobbs, Sheffield University and Patrick Doorly, OUDCE (Lecture Theatre)
In ancient Greek one term, kalon, embraces both aesthetic beauty and the morally fine. Another ancient Greek word aretê, traditionally translated as 'virtue' or 'excellence', shares a common Indo-European root with the Latin 'art' and English 'right'. But are the concepts of beauty and morality really related? What about great, but morally abhorrent, artists? Another conundrum is posed by the status of a work as a work of art. There are many different ways to characterise works of art. Different views may have a different impact on our views on how art and morality are linked, and therefore on censorship. And to what extent can we define the sublime? Perhaps any attempt to define it, or indeed any of our values, will destroy them? Did Socrates' insistence on definition marginalize the values he most cherished in the Western intellectual tradition? During this weekend school we shall address these questions and others.
November 24-25: Scientific Realism And The Challenge From The History Of Science: Peter Vickers, Durham University and Timothy Lyons Purdue University Indianapolis (Lecture Theatre)
Scientific realists claim that science seeks the truth and that we have good reason to believe that our best scientific theories achieve or at least approximate it. Vickers defends epistemic scientific realism, arguing that we can (at least sometimes) identify the parts of our scientific theories which are (approximately) true. By contrast, Lyons argues against epistemic scientific realism. Both Lyons and Vickers draw on historical examples to support their claims, especially historical episodes where scientists were confident they had hit upon 'the truth', but it later turned out that they were radically mistaken. Such cases have often been put forward to challenge the realist claim that the success of science gives us good grounds for believing that science is uncovering the fundamental truths of our universe. Whilst Vickers believes the realist can answer such historical challenges, Lyons is not so optimistic. Lyons does, however, support a realist attitude too when it comes to the aim of science, and he proposes that a refined understanding of the realist aim holds lessons for inquiry in general.

2017
January 14-15: The Philosophy of Creativity: Matthew Kieran and Michael Beaney (Lecture Theatre)
What IS creativity? There are several different conceptions of it, and we will consider some of these during these lectures. We will discuss the role that personal character (motivation, emotion, and attitude) plays in human creativity, and whether curiosity, driven-ness, resilience and the ability to embrace risk are concomitant with creativity, and if so why. We will also consider the supposed failings of the creative character. Are creative people cocky, vain, dismissive and stubborn? If so must they be? Creativity is often linked to the arts. The role played by creativity in logic, mathematics and philosophy has been especially poorly appreciated. We hope to correct this and will reflect on the role played in these disciplines by conceptual creativity.
February 18-19: Introduction to Islamic Ethics: Tariq Ramadan (Tawney Room)
This weekend course will explore the traditional basis of Islamic ethics and how we might apply some of the key elements of this understanding when considering how to approach ethical issues relevant today. Lecture content will cover the theoretical framework (basic terminology, essential concepts and an introduction to theological philosophy and its relationship with ethics from an Islamic perspective) and through case studies will look at how this is applied in practice. Critical discussion and engagement from course participants will be encouraged. The course content does not assume any prior knowledge, although keen students might be interested to read some of the publications of Tariq Ramadan or browse http://www.cilecenter.org (Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics).
March 11-12: Are Economic Sanctions Morally Acceptable?: Cecile Fabre and Liz Ellis (Tawney Room)
Economic sanctions, such as the withdrawal of trade, are imposed when the state (or organisation) imposing the sanction wants to change the behaviour of the state on which the sanctions are imposed. For example the EU and the US have had sanctions in place against Russia since it annexed the Crimea in March 2014. Those sanctions have been intensified on several occasions since. Their aim is to undermine the Russian economy. But do such sanctions work? Do they hurt only those they are supposed to hurt? It seems not: UNICEF estimated that the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 90s, for example, led to the deaths of 500,000 children aged under five from malnutrition and disease. Recently there have been attempts to 'target' sanctions, freezing the assets, for example, of those believed to be responsible for the behavior deemed unacceptable. Economic sanctions raise huge moral and political problems – yet until recently philosophers have not been discussing them.
April 08-09: Thinking of the Impossible: Mark Jago and Ira Kiourti (Lecture Theatre)
Mathematicians tried to square the circle for centuries before realising that it can't be done. Time travel stories abound, even though time travel may well turn out to be impossible. In daily life we often think about impossible things. If Jane makes an error in multiplication, for example, and comes to believe 56 times 12 is 762 she is entertaining an impossible thought. How can we understand the content of thoughts about impossible things? Philosophers have suggested that thought content can be captured in terms of possible worlds. But if a thought is impossible it is not true in any possible world. Moreover, if we admit the existence of possible worlds, we have to address the question of what a possible world is, and what it is like. Come and help us tussle with these issues.
May 13-14: The Philosophy of Spinoza: Susan James and Beth Lord (Sadler Room)
Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) is a major philosopher of the 17th century. Following Descartes, Spinoza developed original views about God, the universe, the human mind, and its relationship to the body and the world. Following Hobbes, he developed important views about political organization and the formation of democracy. Spinoza took geometry as a model for philosophy, and contributed significantly to almost every aspect of philosophy. The Ethics, Spinoza's best-known book, identifies God with Nature. Nature constitutes an infinite, necessary and fully determinist system of which humans are part. From such ideas Spinoza developed an ethical system in which humans find happiness through their rational understanding of the system of which they are part, and of their place within it. Come and learn about this important philosopher, in the company of others with similar interests.
July 23: Philsoc Away Day: Universals: Bob Stone, Neil Webb, Bob Clarke, Peter Gibson.
September 02-03: Members' Weekend: Health: Speakers Brendan Hurley, Judith Stares, Marianne Talbot, Alexander Papadopoulos, David Burridge, Fauzia Rahman-Greasley.
September 16 (one day): Free Speech: Richard Sorabji (Tawney Room)
In this day school we will be examining Free Speech. We shall start by examining the development of the idea of Free Speech starting in the fifth century BC and including ancient Greece, India, Persia, medieval Arabic-speaking countries and medieval Christianity. We shall then consider some of the difficulties inherent in Free Speech. We will consider the USA’s legal requirement on Free Speech, which allows few boundaries, and also John Stuart Mill’s emphasis on the benefits of Free Speech, as opposed to our right to it. We’ll examine the question of what happens when someone exercises their right when that frustrates the benefits of Free Speech, by closing down discussion and understanding. Should lovers of Free Speech voluntarily refrain from indulging their right, or encouraging others to do so, in such cases? Finally we shall look at the difficulties of framing legal boundaries to free speech. Should abuse of religion, class, or race be legally outlawed, if intended to cause offence, or if likely to do so? Did the Brexit campaign uncover further legal difficulties? For example did the law permit too much speech hostile to foreigners, or allow too much mendacity? How should we deal with lies in the newspapers, or abuse on the internet? There will be plenty of opportunity to socialise with other participants and with the speaker.
October 9 - November 13, 14:00 - 15:30: Knowledge (unaccredited lecture series): Marianne Talbot (Lecture Theatre)
The claim that knowledge cannot be false always attracts objections. “Surely people used to know that the Earth was flat?”, people will say “But that was false”. But no, people once falsely believed they knew the Earth was flat. They didn’t, and couldn’t, KNOW it – and that is because if a belief counts as knowledge it must be true. This course will introduce you to Epistemology – the Theory of Knowledge. What is knowledge? Why is knowledge important? What different kinds of knowledge are there? Can we achieve knowledge? If we can achieve knowledge how can we achieve it? Knowledge is one of the most important goods that human beings can achieve – come to these lectures and discover why this is the case.
October 21-22: Wagner and Philosophy: Meade McLoughan and John Deathridge (Lecture Theatre)
Richard Wagner (1813-1883) has long been considered one of the most obviously philosophical of the great artists in the European tradition. This is in recognition both of the way in which his work was particularly open to philosophical influences and of the extent to which it has in turn stimulated significant philosophical responses. We will start by evaluating the importance of Schopenhauer’s philosophy for Wagner, before considering the extent to which the music dramas can be understood as presenting their own distinctive philosophical ideas. There will be then be two different takes on philosophical approaches to Wagner, focusing on the most important and sustained instance of this in the work of Wagner’s one-time friend and colleague, Nietzsche, but also taking in twentieth-century responses from Adorno and others.
November 25-26: The Rationality of Animals: Alex Kecelnic and Marianne Talbot (Lecture Theatre)
Aristotle called humans ‘the only rational animal’. But was he right? What exactly is it to be rational? Are there really no animals (birds, plants…) that are rational? Surely animals, birds and plants might be rational in a different way from human beings? Maybe there are degrees of rationality? We know for sure that different disciplines make use of different accounts of rationality – perhaps the idea of what it is to be rational must be relativized to different disciplines. Perhaps, even within a discipline, it should be relativized to different species? During this weekend a philosopher and a zoologist will be addressing these questions and more.

2016
January 9-10: The Inconsistency of Science: Peter Vickers, Dunja Šešelja and Christian Straßer (Lecture Theatre)
Various examples from the history of science show us that successful, genuine science both can be inconsistent, and even sometimes should be inconsistent. There are also clear examples where an inconsistency means either (a) nothing can be trusted, or (b) only some conclusions can be trusted. So when does an inconsistency matter, and when doesn't it? The answer to this question is best explored not in the abstract, but by looking in detail at a number of concrete examples from the history of science. The presence of inconsistency raises the issue of the underlying nature of science. It is often assumed that the key to science's success lies in its 'logical' approach to the relationship between theory and evidence. But is this logic standard 'classical' logic or a more exotic logic? This debate is crucial, since one's take on it will affect how one distinguishes 'good' and 'bad'reasoning in science, including which inferences are 'sensible' or 'allowed', and thus what a scientific theory does and doesn't tell us about the universe. During this weekend we shall consider these questions and others.
February 20-21: Løgstrup (Danish Ethics): Bob Stern, Glasgow and George Pattison, Glasgow (Tawney Room)
While comparatively little known in the English-speaking world, Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1905-1981) is a major figure in his native Denmark, and interest in his work is growing more widely. His main philosophical work is The Ethical Demand (1956), which offers a broadly phenomenological reflection on the centrality of the ethical requirement to 'love thy neighbour as thyself', what this requirement means, and what might justify it. This leads Løgstrup to introduce themes relating to trust, our radical interdependence, and the responsibility we have for the care of others, all of which he thinks have been wrongly handled by other ethicists. Kant is a major point of critical reference for Løgstrup. But his approach to ethics is very different. He believes that Kant places too much emphasis on duty in ethics, and on general rules. Løgstrup is also critical of Kierkegaard's approach for misunderstanding what is involved in loving the neighbour. Another point of comparison is Levinas, for while they did not know each other's work, both emphasise the significance of the ethical encounter with the other individual, and what this requires of us.
March 12-13: Induction and Science: Marianne Talbot, Martin Christlieb and David Miller (Tawney Room)
Inductive reasoning begins with the known and makes predictions about the unknown. E.g. if I know my drug cured 75% of cancer patients in my trial, then it's likely to cure 75% of the cancer patients in the UK. Likely, but not certain. We shall be considering the pros and cons of this type of reasoning, and examining its role in human thinking. Marianne Talbot will start by distinguishing induction from deduction. David Miller will then suggest that many courses in reasoning fail to explain why correct reasoning is important. He will argue that, although reasoning is often thought to justify, to persuade, and to advance knowledge, it actually does none of these things well. Martin Christlieb will defend induction in the process of testing new therapies. He will explain why clinical trials are needed, the recipe for asking good questions, and how good questions are turned into a testable null hypothesis. He will argue that uncertain beginnings are always reflected in uncertain predictions and that the inductive process of trial design is unavoidable. Finally Miller will maintain that, although the testing of hypotheses is an ineliminable part of science, inductive reasoning is not, indeed, it is neither useful nor beneficial.
April 23-24: An Introduction to Metaphysics: Marianne Talbot (Lecture Theatre)
The word 'metaphysics'is derived from the title of a set of fourteen books by Aristotle. Aristotle himself would not recognize the books under that name. Metaphysics, though, is one of the key sub-disciplines of philosophy, asking such fundamental questions as 'what is the universe made of?', 'what is the nature of a physical object?', 'what are events?', 'what is time?', 'do universals exist?' and 'what limits possibility?'.
May 14-15: Would the Disabled be Better Off Dead?: Benjamin Wood and Gary Keogh (Sadler Room)
Would the disabled be better off dead? Is it discriminations against the people like Tony Nicklinson that we are not allowed to help them to die? Should we use Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis to select against disabled foetuses? What are the rights and wrongs in this distressing area?
July 10: Philsoc AwayDay - on Value: Marianne Talbot, Jonathan Harlow, Bob Stone, Alan Bailey, Nadja Plein.
September 02-03: Members' Weekend: Thought Experiments: Ryan Meade, Janet Cox, Michael Donnan, Marianne Talbot, Peggy Verall, Bob STone.
October 22-23: Has Science shown that Free Will is An Illusion?: Alfred Mele, Helen Beebee and Nura Sidarus (Lecture Theatre)
You might think you are free to choose whether to come to this weekend school or not. But are you right? Not if 'Hard Determinism' is true. According to Hard Determinism, our every action is determined by the conditions obtaining long ago, together with the laws of nature. Free will is an illusion. But then what of our morality and our legal system, both of which seem to depend on the assumption of free will? Compatibilists think determinism is consistent with free will, allowing us to be 'scientifically respectable' and believe in free will. But how can an action be both freely chosen and causally determined? Surely Compatibilism is self-contradictory? And what of science? Hasn't neuroscience shown that our brains have already 'decided' how we should act before we even become conscious of making a choice? If so we must either reject free will or show that Compatibilism is coherent. We will spend the weekend discussing these difficult and important questions with two philosophers and a neuroscientist.
November 26-27: Truth and Relativism: Timothy Williamson and Maria Baghramian (Lecture Theatre)
Relativism comes in many varieties, from some that sound like common sense to others that sound wildly paradoxical. If you believe it is 4 pm, and your friend in France says it is 5 pm, you wouldn't take it amiss – aren't truths about time always relative to time-zones? Nor would you think it odd if your friend insists sardines are tasty, though you loathe them: aren't truths about personal preferences always relative to individuals? Some people even advocate global relativism, according to which all truth – even in science – is relative to a point of view. For most people, that is going too far. Moral relativism insists that truth about what is right or wrong is relative to a moral framework. Do we need such relativism to avoid dogmatism and intolerance? But is relativism self-defeating? During this weekend we shall be discussing these issues with two philosophers with a long-term interest in them.

2015
January 10-11: Philosophy of Music: Nick Zangwill, Hull and Joel Kruger, Warwick (Lecture Theatre)
The Philosophy of Music asks fundamental questions about the nature of music and our experience of it. Why, for example, do we find music so valuable? What is a musical work of art (a performance? the score?)? How do our sensorimotor capacities process the perceptual character and content of musical experience? Can we speak of a musically extended mind? The CEO of the London Philharmonic recently declared 'music and politics don't mix'. Was he right? How can music express emotion? Does it express emotion? Must music be beautiful to be good? What is it for music to be beautiful? Come along and help us think about these questions and others.
February 21-22: Finding God: Event cancelled.
March 14-15: Philosophy and Political Action: Mark Reiff, Manchester and Andrew Williams, Warwick (Tawney Room)
What is the relationship between politics and philosophy? In particular what is the relationship between political action and philosophy? Can political leaders, for example, violate moral constraints for a great good, or to avoid great catastrophe? How should a just state distribute its goods? How much economic inequality is morally acceptable? How should we manage our obligations to the different generations? Is it fair to benefit older generations at the expense of the young (or vice versa)? What does justice require of a liberal state? Do come along to this weekend school, listen to what our speakers have to say, and contribute to the debate.
April 25-26: The Philosophy of Necessity and Possibility: Bob Hale, Sheffield and Jessica Leech, Sheffield (Sadler Room)
Most philosophers agree that there is an important distinction to be made between propositions which necessarily true and those which, though true, might have been false. The proposition that Paris is the capital of France and the proposition that there is a prime between every number greater than 1 and its double are both true. But whereas the former could have been false and the latter could not. How is this difference to be understood? How do we know, if we do, about what's necessary and what's possible? When something is necessary, or possible, what makes it so? Might you have been a hippopotamus? Might you have been a different sex? What limits the possibilities? Drawing on contemporary and some past philosophical work, including their own, our speakers will discuss some answers to these and related questions. They will not be assuming you already know about this subject, so if it interests you don't hesitate.
May 16 at 13:30 Philsoc AGM: Draft minutes of the 2015 Annual General Meeting
May 16-17: Consciousness: Ted Honderich, UCL and Ian Philips, Oxford (Lecture Theatre)
The problem of consciousness has been called the 'hard problem'. How is it possible for a lump of grey matter inside our skulls to be conscious? How can it have a perspective, be distraught or cheerful, how can it experience red and so on? If Mary, a scientist who has lived her whole life in a monochrome environment but who knows everything there is to know about the physical universe, goes outside and sees a red rose, has she learned something she didn't know? If so then how can we say that our world is entirely material? During this weekend we shall be considering this problem and its ramifications for science.
July 26: Philsoc AwayDay - on Reality: Jonathan Harlow, Frank Brierley, Peter Gibson, Bob Clarke, Mike Arnautov.
What is the world 'really' like, and how can we know?
September 05-06 Members' Weekend: Truth: Fauzia Rahman-Greasley, Simon Borrington, Peter Gibson, Eileen Walker, Peter Townsend, Jonathan Harlow.
October 21 - December 2: The Nature of Causation: Marianne Talbot (Unaccredited lecture series, Lecture Theatre, Wednesdays 14:00 - 15:30)
The causal relation is probably one of the most important relations in the world. Without the relation of cause to effect we wouldn't be able to predict or explain anything. But what is this relation? How, for example, is causation related to explanations? Are all explanations causal explanations? And what are the relata of the causal relation? Are they events, states of affairs, facts, properties, tropes or one of the other myriad candidates for this relation? And are there two relata, the cause and the effect? Some philosophers have suggested that there are three or even four. Can causation go backwards? How, anyway, is the causal relation related to time? Is there anything special about mental causation? If so what is it? During these lectures we will examine the causal relation, all the questions above and others. There will be plenty of opportunity to ask questions.
October 24-25: Drones, Robots and the Ethics of Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: Paul Gittings and Alex Leveringhaus (Lecture Theatre)
Unmanned weapons are not new. In the 1800s bomb-filled balloons were deployed in an attack on Venice. But technology has since enabled us to put even more distance between the combatants in war. It is clear that fully automated robotic weapons are not far away. Such weapons would disable, destroy and kill in a completely automated process. Humans would, of course, programme them. But no human would feature in the 'kill chain'. But will AI ever enable a robot to distinguish between a wounded combatant and a prone sniper or a child with a toy gun and a soldier with a rifle? Will it ever enable a robot to decide whether destroying a bridge will cause unacceptable casualties in a nearby school? Surely killing should be a choice? Robots don't make choices: if they are programmed to kill they will kill. Should such weapons be banned? If not how should we regulate them? During this weekend these questions and others will be discussed by a serving military officer with responsibility for automated weapons, and a philosopher, who specialises in thinking about them.
November 21-22: The Critical Imagination: James Grant and Peter Lamarque (Lecture Theatre)
The Critical Imagination is a study of metaphor, imaginativeness, and criticism. Literary works can be interpreted differently; architecture can be seen as stately or forbidding; music can 'shimmer', prose can be 'perfumed', and a painter's colouring 'effervescent'. During this weekend we shall be examining how we experience and appreciate art.

2014
January 11 at 13:15 Philsoc AGM: Minutes of the 2014 Annual General Meeting
January 11-12: The Domain of Reasons: John Skorupski, St Andrews and Hallvard Lillehammer, Cambridge. (Lecture Theatre)
In his latest book, justly called his magnum opus The Domain of Reasons, John Skorupski offers a comprehensive account of the relation between self, thought and world. It has been described (by our other speaker) as having explanatory ambitions comparable to (at least) the first two of Kant's Critiques. Skorupski argues for two main theses: (i) The building blocks of moral standards are relations of reason, (ii) claims about reason relations, though true and false, are not claims about matters of fact. During this weekend John will introduce us to the two main theses of his book, with comments and questions adduced by Hallvard Lillehammer, from Cambridge, who reviewed the book for the Notre Dame Philosophical review.
February 22-23: Philosophy of Art: Derek Matraver, Open University and Louise Hanson, Oxford. (Tawney Room)
Philosophy of art involves applying the philosophical method to art. It considers such questions as 'What is art?', 'Can something immoral nevertheless be a work of art?', 'If a fake is identical to a work of art why is it not worth as much?', 'What, if anything, does the notion of 'beauty' have to do with art?'. How do philosophers go about answering these questions? Do these question have answers? How do we know the answers when we get to them? During this weekend school we will address questions such as these, and many that you, as the audience, will bring with you.
March 15-16: Is Philosophy Dead?: Professor John Lennox, Oxford and Professor Steve Fuller, Warwick. (Tawney Room)
In 2011 Professor Stephen Hawking, the world renowned physicist, told the Google Zeitgeist Conference that philosophy is dead because philosophers have not kept up with science. Hawking is not the only scientist who is pessimistic about the future of philosophy. Indeed he takes his place amongst many scientific worthies who have written off philosophy as 'science-lite'. But should we agree that philosophy is dead? Do these scientists really know what it is they are writing off? During this weekend we will discuss the fascinating questions involved in this issue.
April 26-27: Neuromania: Professor Raymond Tallis and Iain McGilchrist. (Lecture Theatre)
It has become fashionable in recent years to appeal to the brain as the locus, and explanation, of everything to do with the human mind. Neuroscientists confidently point to fMRI scans to claim that they have discovered love, wisdom or whatever, or to support their claim to be able to show that free will is an illusion. But Professor Raymond Tallis, well-used to fMRI scans in his work, has coined the word 'neuromania' to express his rejection of this popular view. Dr Iain McGilchrist, whose research and clinical practice has been informed by scanning the brain, entirely agrees with this view. Crass, however, as the sort of claims which Professor Tallis refers to might be, he believes that it would be a mistake to deduce that we can learn nothing valuable about ourselves by a better understanding of the brain: the quality of the answers we get from looking at the brain depends crucially on the sort of questions we ask. By properly understanding the functions of the two hemispheres of the brain, we can illuminate some aspects of the human mind and of human experience. During this weekend we will have the opportunity to listen to both views, be introduced to the disagreement between Tallis and McGilchrist, and come to our own decision as to who is – or whether both might be – right.
May 17-18: Philosophy of Cosmology: Simon Saunders, Oxford and Martin Sahlen, Oxford. (Sadler Room)
Observational cosmology is in a golden age of discovery, but a deeper understanding of what is meant by a science of cosmology is in its infancy. It must involve physics, philosophy, and cosmogony – a philosophy of cosmology. Funded by the Templeton Foundation the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge are collaborating to start a new field in philosophy of physics devoted to this new subject. The sort of questions that will be addressed by this new area include: What is time? Is the universe infinite, and if so, what difference does this make to our methods of understanding it? What is the meaning and metaphysics of probability in the context of fundamental physical and cosmological theories? Is our universe one among many? What reasons are there for 'many-universe' and 'bubble-universe' hypotheses? Are these hypotheses testable? What can be known and tested about hypotheses concerning the whole universe? During this weekend we will start thinking about some of these questions.
September 20 - 21: Members' Weekend: The Nature of Thought: Mike Arnautov, James Innes, Christian Michel, Eileen Walker, Bob Stone and Ann Long (Sadler Room/Lecture Theatre)
October 25-26: Philosophy in a Weekend: Marianne Talbot, Oxford (Lecture Theatre)
Philosophy is the oldest discipline in the world (except perhaps, for theology). It was the precursor to all the sciences. The word 'philosophy' comes from the Greek philosophia or love of wisdom. Philosophers show their love of wisdom by being interested in every other field of endeavour. If it is studied by human beings there is a 'philosophy' of it, from Philosophy of Physics to Philosophy of Film. During this weekend, which is aimed at complete beginners to philosophy, Marianne Talbot will be introducing you to thinking philosophically through four highly interactive lectures. Do not come if you are not prepared to think!
November 22-23: The Emergent Multiverse: David Wallace, Oxford and Harvey Brown, Oxford. (Lecture Theatre)
The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics holds that quantum theory – our best current theory of physics – is correctly understood as claiming that there are many worlds that exist in parallel to our own and which branch constantly off our own. The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to make sense of physics without action-at-a-distance, objective randomness, or any strange role for "observer" or "consciousness". During this weekend school we shall be discussing this interpretation of QM and asking what would follow from its being the correct one.

2013
January 12 at 13:15 Philsoc AGM: Minutes of the 2013 Annual General Meeting
January 12-13: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: Luciano Floridi, Oxford. (Lecture Theatre)
A new philosophy of information has been derived from three philosophical lessons suggested by Turing's work. The first tells us how important it is, when asking questions, to specify the correct level of abstraction. The second discusses the philosophical questions that are the most pressing, and the third a new philosophical anthropology. This last topic will be taken up in a discussion of the fact that recent technological transformations in the life-cycle of information have brought about a humbling, but exciting, fourth revolution, in the process of reassessing humanitybs fundamental nature and role in the universe. This will enable us to develop a new ecological approach to reality. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have become environmental forces, creating and shaping our reality, more and more pervasively, by 'enveloping' the world. The technical concept of 'enveloping' will be explained, along with the promise it holds out for our futures. But we will not ignore the risks implicit in transforming the world into a progressively ICT-friendly environment, asking whether our technologies are going to enable and empower us, or constrain our physical and conceptual spaces so we are forced to adjust to them?
February 16-17: Philosophy in a Weekend: Nigel Warburton, Open University and Marianne Talbot, Oxford. (Lecture Theatre)
Philosophy is for people who are intrigued by questions like 'what is truth?', 'do we have free will?', 'what is justice?' and 'does space come to an end?'. It is one thing to be intrigued by such questions, another to be equipped with the skills to answer them. These skills are the skills of philosophy. This weekend is an introduction to those skills. Both speakers are very experienced in speaking to complete beginners in philosophy.
March 09-10: Philosophy of the Family: Adam Swift, Balliol and Matthew Clayton, Warwick. (Tawney Room)
The family has been thought of as the cornerstone of society. But what exactly is a family? Why are families considered so important? Is it always best for children to be raised by their parents in a family? What are parents obliged to provide for their children? Is 'a life worth living' too little? If so is 'the best upbringing they can provide' too demanding? Are parents morally justified in bringing up children with religious affiliations? Is this only so long as the children are not prevented from reflecting on alternatives? Do parents have the right to confer advantages on their own children? Any advantage? What if such advantages come at the expense of creating social inequality? During this weekend we shall be addressing all these questions.
April 27-28: Pragmatics of Language: Emma Borg, Reading University and Robyn Carston, UCL. (Lecture Theatre)
What is the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and the meaning of an utterance of that sentence? Intuitively they seem intimately related, yet we know they can't be identical (one can utter 'It is a lovely day' and thereby mean that it is a horrible day, if one is being ironic, but that's not what the sentence 'It is a lovely day' means). So how should we think about the relationship between sentences and the contexts in which they are spoken? During this weekend we shall be considering the nature of context-sensitvity in natural languages and asking what kind of theory of meaning can best handle the relationship between linguistic meaning and context.
May 18-19: Philosophy of Literature: Prof Peter Lamarque, York and Dr Eileen John, Warwick. (Sadler Room)
During this weekend we shall be considering some enduring questions in the philosophy of literature. We shall consider, for example, the peculiar alchemy that gives a poem its special value, the question of whether great literary works – tragedies, novels, epic poems, etc – are valuable in part because of the truths they reveal about human nature, and why we worry about the choices made by fictional characters, experiencing them as living, striving and suffering individuals, in whose triumphs we rejoice, and whose downfalls we savour. We shall also consider whether we want to be morally improved by literature, and indeed whether we are morally improved by it. Can we understand the emotional, cognitive, and interpretive demands of literary works as morally significant and valuable, even if we are typically not absorbing moral truths from the works we read?
September 7 - 8: Members' Weekend: Empiricism: Peter Townsend, Simon Borrington, Barbara Wainwright, Jonathan Harlow, Terry Duchow and Peter Gibson (Lecture Theatre)
October 26-27: A Romp Through the Foothills of Formal Logic: Marianne Talbot, Oxford. (Sadler Room)
Marianne's lectures in Critical Reasoning have been hugely popular. So much so that people have asked her if she would take them just a bit further and introduce them to formal logic. This is precisely what Marianne intends to do over this weekend. We shall be considering why logicians formalise arguments, and how they do so. We shall look at the traps that can befall anyone who tries to formalise English arguments, and we shall consider the limitations of this activity. By the end of the weekend you should be able to take simple English arguments, formalise them in the language of the propositional calculus and test them by means of truth tables and semantic tableaux.
November 23-24: The Philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz: Julia Wecken, Reading and Lloyd Strickland, Manchester. (Tawney Room)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 &ndash 1716) was one of the greatest thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries. He was, indeed, compared to Plato by his contemporary Diderot, who claimed that "Perhaps never has a man read as much, studied as much, meditated more, and written more than Leibnizb& What he has composed on the world, God, nature, and the soul is of the most sublime eloquence. If his ideas had been expressed with the flair of Plato, the philosopher of Leipzig would cede nothing to the philosopher of Athens.". Leibniz was a polymath, making contributions to fields as diverse as metaphysics, epistemology and logic, philosophy of religion, mathematics, physics, geology, jurisprudence, and history. During this weekend we will learn something about his work, in particular his views on metaphysics and explanation.

2012
January 14 at 13:15 Philsoc AGM: Minutes of the 2012 Annual General Meeting
January 14-15: Utilitarianism, Prohibitions, and Prerogatives: Brad Hooker, Reading Univ. (Lecture Theatre)
Utilitarians believe the right action is that which (tends to) produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Utilitarianism might reasonably be called the ethics of modernity. These lectures introduce utilitarianism, distinguish different versions, discuss objections and outline what might be salvaged to form a plausible moral theory.
February 18-19: Wittgenstein's Influence on Science: John Preston, Reading University and Chon Tejedor, Oxfrod University (Lecture Theatre)
We'll be looking at how Wittgenstein distinguished philosophy and science, his beliefs about how they were related, the 'net' metaphor of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,and the kind of approach to science that would result from taking it seriously. Was Wittgenstein really hostile to science as many have thought?
March 10-11: What Is Mathematics About?: Dan Isaacson, Oxford and Richard Pettigrew, Bristol (Tawney Room)
What (if anything) is mathematics about? How is it possible to know any mathematics? The attempt to give an account of mathematics that can answer both questions has been a major catalyst to development in the philosophy of mathematics over the past fifty years. We'll be looking at both questions.
April 21-22: Hegel: Robert Stern, Sheffield and Stephen Houlgate, Warwick (Lecture Theatre)
Our aim is to shed light on Hegel's idealism, attitude to scepticism, his views on history, on ethics, freedom, art and religion. We'll consider Hegel's most difficult text, the Science of Logic, to explain how and why it transforms our understanding of basic categories, such as "being" and "something".
May 19-20: The Origins of Metaphysics in Presocratic Philosophy: Catherine Osborne, UEA (Sadler Room)
Thales suggested that the earth floats on water. Parmenides proposed that nothing changes and there is only one thing. Primitive? No, the Presocratics were already considering deep issues such as what there is, why and how can we know about it? A lively exploration of the beginnings of philosophy.
September 8: Members' Day: Themes in Metaphysics: Eileen Walker, Mike Arnautov, Jeanne Warren and David Kemp (Sadler Room)
October 15 to November 19: Critical Reasoning for Beginners: Marianne Talbot, Oxford University. (Lecture Theatre)
A series of six Monday lectures, all 14:00 - 15:30. (no recordings available).
Reason is central to our lives as human beings. Without reason we would never be able to know anything except through our senses. But to be able to reason is to be able to reason either well or badly. If we reason badly we may form all sorts of false beliefs. If we reason well our beliefs are far more likely to be true. During this 6 week course we will look at what it is to reason critically, and at how we might enhance our ability to reason well. The course is aimed at complete beginners.
October 27-28: Paradoxes in the Philosophy of Religion: Michael Scott, Manchester University and Dr Pamela Anderson, Oxford. (Sadler Room)
If God is all powerful then can he create a stone too heavy for him to lift? If he can't there is something he cannot do, ie. create such a stone; if he can there is something he cannot do, ie. lift the stone that he has created. There are many other paradoxes generated by the concept of God, and by religion in gerenal. During this weekend we will look at some of them and ask whether they can be solved.
November 24-25: Anti-Realism.: Jan Westerhoff, Cambridge University and Brian King, Oxford. (Tawney Room)
Many of us may have entertained the possibility that moral values, or numbers, are not real. We might even have considered the possibility that minds, especially the minds of others, are not real. But have you ever wondered whether the physical objects we see around us are real or not? Or whether we are ourselves real? Anti-Realism is a metaphysical stance that can be taken with respect to categories of the things we usually think of in our daily lives as being real. During this weekend we will consider the nature of Anti-Realism, and why someone might be an Anti-Realist with respect to some category or other.

2011

January 15 13:15, Philsoc AGM

Minutes of the 2011 Annual General Meeting

January 15 - 16: Hume's Sceptical Stance

Peter Millican

February 19 - 20: The Philosophy of Mathematics

Alexander Paseau and Florian Steinberger

March 12 - 13: Time, Space and Quantum: the Philosophy of Physics

Professor Harvey Brown and Chris Timpson

April 16 - 17: A Romp Through the History of Philosophy

Marianne Talbot

May 21 - 22: Meaning and Mind: Talks on the Philosophy of Language

Professor James Higginbotham and Professor Barry Smith

September 3: Members' Day: Philosophy: What's the Point?

Robert Stone, Ann Long, Peter Gibson and Peter Ells (Lecture Theatre)

October 29-30: The Aesthetics and Criticism of Music

Roger Allen, Oxford and Paul Harper-Scott, Royal Holloway (Sadler Room)
This course considered issues in the Aesthetics of Music from both historical and contemporary philosophical perspectives. Roger Allen examined the nineteenth-century debate between music as autonomous object and expressive force as epxressed in the writings of, inter alia, Wagner, Hanslick, Schopenhauer and Nietszche. He aslo considered how ideas of the Sublime might impact on issues of music analysis, with specific reference to Bruckner. Paul Harper Scott continued the Wagnerian theme in a contemporary context through engagement with radical philosophical persepectives of sex and capitalism.

November 26-27: A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind

Marianne Talbot (Tawney Room)
Where would we be without the mind? But what is the mind? Is it the brain? Descartes thought definitely not. But don't we know better in our scientific times? So why is dualism again attracting philosophers, and what is it that science will never tell us about the mind?

2010

January 16 13:15, Philsoc AGM

Minutes of the 2010 Annual General Meeting

January 16 - 17: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind

Severin Schroeder

February 20 - 21: Morality and Evolutionary Psychology

Oliver Curry and Janet Radcliffe-Richards

March 13 - 14: Philosophy of Aquinas

David Oderberg and Stephen Boulter

April 24 - 25: The God Delusion: Is Dawkins Right?

Marianne Talbot and Dr Stephen Law
(The OUDCE website has video recordings of all five sessions.)

May 22 - 23: Philosophy of Hilary Putnam

Max de Gaynesford and Gerald Lang

September 4: Members' Day: Themes in Epistemology

Peter Gibson, Frank Brierley, Jonathan Beale and Christian Michel (Lecture Theatre)

October 30 - 31: The Philosophy of Confucius: Dao, Wisdom and the Self

Nick Bunnin and Xinzhong Yao

November 27 - 28: Moral Philosophy: Fundamental Questions

Ralph Wedgwood

2009

Philsoc AGM

Minutes of the 2009 Annual General Meeting

The Philosophy of Schopenhauer

Chris Janaway

Philosophy for Beginners

Marianne Talbot

Socrates: The Father of Philosophy

Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karismanis

The Philosophy of Time

Robin le Poidevin and Craig Bourne

Members' Day: State, Law and Individual

Steve Chinn, Rob Judges, Alan Bailey, Ann Long, James Calvert, Peter Townsend.

Debate on Dawkins' 'God Delusion'

Marianne and Stephen Law.
Marianne's slides are available as Powerpoint or as PDF.
The OUDCE website holds an MP3 audio recording of the event.

Critical Reasoning for Beginners

Marianne Talbot
No recording available.

The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre

Anthony Hatzimoys and Sorin Baiasu

War Torture and Terrorism: Are they ever Justifiable?

Seth Lazar and Hilary Greaves

2008

Philsoc AGM

Minutes of the 2008 Annual General Meeting

Russell & Wittgenstein: A Philosophical Partnership

Ray Monk

Nietzsche

Keith Ansell-Pearson and Ken Gemes

Thinking About the Mind

Anita Avramides and Edward Harcourt

The Philosophy of Mcdowell

Marie McGinn and Jennifer Hornsby

God and the Meaning of Life

John Cottingham and Julian Baggini

Members' Day: Why Should we be Good?

Tom Fisher, Ben Basing, Brenda Johnson, Hugh Millar, Michael Donnan

Mind as Machine

Margaret Boden and Aaron Sloman. Click here for information

The Philosophy of Willard van Orman Quine

Christopher Hookway and Joe Morrison

2007

Propositions: A Guide to the Propositional Content of Thoughts and Sayings

Marianne Talbot

Scientism

Tom Sorell and Roger Trigg

The Limits of Knowledge

Tim Williamson and Dorothy Edgington

Democracy in China

Torbjörn Lodén, Dr Lin Chun and Nicholas Bunnin

Issues of Life and Death

Chris Belshaw and Steve Holland

Members' Day: Ann Long's book 'Making God'

Ann Long, Charles Brown, Alan Bailey

The Legacy of Karl Popper

David Miller and Robert Frazier

Getting to Grips with Logic

Marianne Talbot

2006

The Limits of Tolerance

Glen Newey and Alan Haworth

Aesthetics

Matthew Kieran and Derek Matravers

Winning Arguments

Marianne Talbot

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Adrian Moore and Lucy Allais

Members' Day: Philosophy of Language

Frank Brierley, Alan Bailey, Peter Townsend

Causation

Marianne Talbot (2 Linked weekends)

Wittgenstein

Stephen Law and Severin Schroeder

2005

The Freedom of the Will

Helen Stewart, Martha Klein

The Objectivity of Science

Eleonora Montuschi, James Ladyman

Perception and Reason

Bill Brewer, Fiona MacPherson

Members' Day: Philosophy of Science

Trevor Hussey, Paul Cockburn, Phil Rees, Peter Gibson

Conversational Implicature: Questiont, Lies and Knowledge

Jenny Saul and Christopher Hookway

Truth and Indexicals

Mark Textor and Keith Hossack

Folk Psychology and the Nature ot Interpretation

Marianne Talbot (2 Linked weekends)

2004

The Persistence of Things

Katherine Hawley, David Mackie

The Location of the Mind

Marianne Talbot

Continental Philosophy

Annamaria Carusi, Katherine Morris

Members' Day: The Mind-Body Problem

David Hunt, Sabine Molisso, Phil Rees, David Seed, Winston Han

The Philosophy of David Lewis

John Divers, Joseph Melia

Concepts and their Contribution to Thought

Chris Daly, Stephen Laurence

The Laws of Nature

Alexander Bird, Helen Beebee

2003

Ethics: Truth or Persuasion?

Simon Blackburn, Marianne Talbot

The Philosophy of Biology

Peter King, Andrew Wright

Relativizing Truth

Mark Sainsbury, Max Kobel

Members' Day: Causes and Reasons

Alan Bailey, Eileen Walker, Andrew Dalkin, Peter Townsend

The Emotions

Michael Lacewing David Pugmire

The Grounds of Morality

Jerry Cohen, Daniel Kofman

The Nature of Rationality

Marianne Talbot

2002

Responses to Scepticism

John Cottingham, Crispin Wright and Marianne Talbot

Love and the Philosophers

Roger Scruton and Angela Hobbs

Members' Day: Naturalistic Ethics

Charles Brown, Peter Gibson, Ann Long

Necessity and Possibility

Penelope Mackie, John Divers

The Philosophy of Frege

Guy Longworth, Ian Rumfitt

The Mind-Body Problem

Marianne Talbot

2001

John Locke and his Contemporary Legacy

Michael Lockwood

Consciousness and Nature

Nicholas Maxwell and Galen Strawson

Existentialism

Dian Collinson and Alison Haley

Causation

Marianne Talbot, Prof D H Mellor and Dr Tim Crane

The ethics of the New Biotechnology

John Harris and Ruth Chadwick

2000

Models of Reality

Michael Lockwood

From Computation to Machine Intelligence: Turint's Legacy

Andrew Hodges, Roger Penrose and Donald Gillies

Virtue

Roger Crisp, Rosalind Hursthouse and Marianne Talbot

Oriental Philosophy

Ray Billington

Faith, Reason and Science

Christopher Insole and John Lennox

1999

The Philosophy of David Hume

Michael Lockwood

The Cambridge Platonists and their Antecedents

John Kerr, Sarah Hutton, David Pailin

Minds and Persons

Paul Snowdon, Robert Kirk

Language and Meaning

Oswald Hanfling and John Dupr

Chaos, Uncertainty and Prediction

Leonard Smith and Peter Smith

1998

The Nature of Time

Michael Lockwood

Understanding Scientific Progress

Nicholas Maxwell, James Ladyman, Stathis Psillos

Medieval Philosophy

Anthony Kenny, Fritz Zimmerman, Richard Sorabji

Creation and Cosmology

Joao Magueijo, Chris Isham, John Leslie

Understanding Kant

John Kenyon, Ralph Walker

1997

The Enigma of Consciousness

Michael Lockwood

A Brief History of Infinity

David Bostock, Adrian Moore

Political Justice and Personal Choice

G A Cohen, Brian Barry

The Fabric of Reality

David Deutsch, Roger Scruton

Choosing Between Moral Theories

Brad Hooker, Roger Crisp

1996

Physics and Metaphysics

Michael Lockwood

Plato

L Brown, B Williams,Dian Collinson

Equality

D Parfit, Janet Radcliffe Richards

Descartes: Philosopher-Scientist

Annie Bitbol Hespris, Desmond Clarke,John Cottingham.

Human Rights

James Griffin, Michael Rosen

1995

The Dawn of Philosophy

Michael Lockwood

Moral Theory and Moral Practice

T Sorrell, John Harris

Language and Meaning

O Hanfling, H Glock

Godel's Theorem and Its Philosophical Implications

D Isaacson, R Penrose, R Monk, J Lucas, A Ekert

Reason and Morality

Philippa Foot

1994

Russell and Wittgenstein

Michael Lockwood

Animal Minds

R Sorabji, Marian Dawkins, Marianne Talbot

Mill's Utilitarianism

R Crisp, B Hooker, J Gray

Concepts of Space and Place

J O Urmson, R Harr, H Brown

The Riddle of Induction

J Worall, D Deutsch, J Watkins, J Foster

1993

Oriental Philosophy

R Wilkinson, Dian Collinson

Alan Turing

R Gandy, A Hodges, R Penrose, D Deutsch

Descartes

J Cottingham, T Sorell

An Introduction to Logic

Marianne Talbot

1992

Philosophy and Literary Theory

David Grylls, T Eagleton, C Norris, T Nuttall

The Unity of Consciousness

Q Cassam, S Hurley, D Parfit, B Williams

Understanding Evil

J Glover, R Swinburne, H McCabe

The Virtues

R Crisp, Philippa Foot

1991

Philosophy in Cambridge 1900-1920

R Mason, M Sainsbury

Letting the Patient Die

Sophie Botros, W Cartwright

Psychoanalysis and Philosophy

A Storr, J Ree

Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness

E Squires, D Deutsch, M Bitbol, I Marshall

1990

The Anthropic Principle

J Barrow, D Deutsch, M Redhead, D Sciama

Philosophy in France

J Ree, S Sim

The Nature of Time

R Sorabji, J R Lucas

Art and Aesthetic Experience

O Hanfling, Dian Collinson

1989

Plato: Virtue, Knowledge and the Soul

Lesley Brown, J Urmson

Practical Ethics

M Lockwood, R M Hare

Free Will, Responsibility and Desert

M Klein, H Robinson

Liberalism

J Gray, J Griffin

1988

Thomas Hobbes

G M Ross, Iain McLean

Philosophy Before Socrates

P Nowell-Smith, J Barnes

Human Learning and the Growth of Knowledge

D Deutsch, T Hussey

Existentialism

A Manser, D Collinson, A Chadwick

1987

Leibniz

G M Ross, S Brown

Man, God and the New Biology

A Peacocke, J Durant, M Lockwood

Justice, Welfare and the Allocation of Health

Care R Frey, M Lockwood

Aristotle the Philosopher

A Kenny, J Barnes

Spinoza

A Quinton, R Walker

Nietzsche and Schopenhauer

Dian Collinson, R Hollinrake

1986

Scepticism and Other Minds

G Gillett, P Snowdon

Values and Virtues

P Foot, J Urmson

The Ends of Life

O Hanfling, J Griffin

1985

Justice, Needs and Welfare

J Waldron, Alan Ryan

Polanyi, Philosopher-Scientist

J Puddefoot, P Hodgson

George Berkeley

H Robinson, M Ayres

Quantum Mechanics and Reality

D Deutsch, D Wood

Mind and Thought

C McGinn, Kathy Wilkes

1984

Nuclear Deterrence

J Glover, M Dummett

Ethics and Objectivity

J McDowell, S Blackburn

Popper and the Logic of Scientific Discovery

J Cohen, J Watkins

1983

Emotion and Reality

R Scruton, Kathy Wilkes

Mind and Brain

J R Lucas, S Blackburn

Personal Identity

D Parfit, R Swinburne

J S Mill and the Limits of Liberty

J Barnes, J Waldron

1982

Philosophy and the Arts

Alan Caine

Philosophy, Science and Personality

Margaret Boden

Democracy

???

Philosophical Approach to Mysticism

G Moore

Freedom and Determinism

M Lockwood

Imagination in Education

Mary Warnock

1981

Moral Philosophy

R M Hare B Mitchell

The American Pragmatists

Ira S Steinberg

The Trouble with Evolution

J Durant

1980

The New Psychology and its Images of Man

R Harré

Sartre

Keith Gore

Philosophy and Political Economy

R Smethurst

1979

Philosophy of Religion

J Macquarrie et al

Professional Ethics

H Loukes

Social Study and Biology

V Pratt

1978

Concepts of Space and Matter

R Harre

Philosophy and the Law

A Kenny

Man and his Values in Contemporary German Philosophy

B Smith et al

1977

Philosophy and the Arts

N Gentle, A S Chadwick

Time

W H Newton-Smith

Concept of Justice and Educational Policy

R Plant, R M Hare et al

1976

The Self, Faith and Reason in Science and Religion

J R Lucas et al

Philosophy and Literature

Montefiore et al

1975

Topics on the Philosophy of Mind

G Ryle

Social Philosophy

Alan Cook, J Mabbott

1974

Political Philosophy

W L Weinstein

Authenticity

M Norman

1973

Meaning and Truth in the Arts

I W G Moore, C Headington

Meaning and Truth in the Arts II

M P F Machlin

1972

Is Man a Part of Nature?

A Quinton

TEST website instance

OUDCE Philosophy Weekend and Day Courses
at Rewley House

General Events Information

Other OUDCE courses

Future Events Programme

Past Events

TEST website instance

OUDCE Philosophy Weekend and Day Courses at Rewley House

General Events Information

Other OUDCE courses

Future Events Programme

Past Events

OUDCE Philosophy Weekend and Day Courses
at Rewley House